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Mao Zedong is once again back in the news. He was resurrected byChongqing (重庆) Party Secretary Bo Xilai (薄熙来) around fouryears ago to lend cultural/ideological weight to the experiment
Bo planned with a socialism that would combine Mao-style populist egal-
itarianism with tighter party-state control over the economy; this time
within the context of global capitalism, of which the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) is an integral component, if not a motor force. The search for
answers to apparent disagreements over Bo’s recent dismissal by those sus-
picious of his challenge to the existing state-capitalism controlled by the
Communist Party seems only to have intensified speculation over the
strength of Maoism in the Party.
So deeply is Mao identified with the Cultural Revolution in contemporary
consciousness that observers of recent developments rarely draw a distinc-
tion between a Mao revival and a cultural revolutionary revival. Symbolic it
may have been, but Bo’s revival of Red Culture was most importantly rem-
iniscent of the Cultural Revolution, which despite some relaxation is still a
taboo subject in the People’s Republic of China. Whether or not it was di-
rected at Bo, Premier Wen Jiabao’s (温家宝) recent warning of a possible re-
currence of the Cultural Revolution unless problems of development –
mainly political and economic inequality and corruption – were resolved
offered a tacit recognition of at least one important reason for the anxiety
that is usually ignored these days in discussions of the Cultural Revolution:
the Cultural Revolution as an attack on the inequalities created by the Com-
munist Party, whose reason for existence theoretically was to abolish in-
equality. (3) To recall the Cultural Revolution if only symbolically is to draw
attention to a problem that is far more severe at present than it was in the
1960s. And that is not permissible; talk of class difference and division has
been largely silenced in the PRC as it has in other contemporary societies,
and perhaps for more easily understandable reasons.
The same, however, is not the case with Mao – not the Mao of the Cultural
Revolution but the Mao of the Chinese revolution and founding of the PRC.
I argue in this essay that salvaging Mao from the Cultural Revolution to ap-
propriate him for “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been one of
the strategic ideological concerns of the post-Mao leadership from Deng
Xiaoping to the present. My analysis is based on the contemporary con-
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1. I am grateful to Yige Dong, Sebastian Veg, Wang Guo, and Wu Yiching for reading and commenting
on this essay. I am especially grateful to Sebastian Veg for helping me acquire the sources without
which this essay would not have been possible. I am also grateful to an anonymous reader for
China Perspectives for a careful reading and astute suggestions. These colleagues and friends
helped enrich the argument but bear no responsibility for its shortcomings.
2. My use of “official” here needs some explanation, as it determines the coverage of the discussion.
In some basic sense, all discourse and history in China is official, as both are closely watched and
censored by the authorities. There is considerable leeway within limits, but the limits matter. The
most important of such limitations are sensitive matters relating to leaders. I was personally ac-
quainted with those limits when my book Anarchism in China was banned and collected almost
immediately after its Chinese translation was published, apparently on the grounds that “it insulted
our leaders.” My use of “official” here is limited in coverage to officially-produced works that es-
tablish those official limits to interpretation that then provide a guide for permissible interpreta-
tion for society at large but most importantly for the Party – at least that is the intention. Also
excluded from the discussion are works produced by officials after they have left office, some of
whom have been quite harsh in their departures from the official line. For a brief but useful general
survey of recent Mao scholarship, see Xiao Yanzhong, “Recent Mao Zedong Scholarship in China,”
in Timothy Cheek (ed.), A Critical Introduction to Mao, New York, Cambridge University Press,
2010, pp. 273-287.
3. “China’s Wen Jiabao calls for `urgent’ political reform,” The Telegraph, Thursday, 5 April 2012,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9142333/China’s-Wen-Jiabao-calls-for-
urgent-political-reform.html (consulted on 30 April 2012).
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ABSTRACT: Rather than repudiate Mao’s legacy, the post-revolutionary regime in China has sought to recruit him in support of “reform and
opening.” Beginning with Deng Xiaoping after 1978, official (2) historiography has drawn a distinction between Mao the Cultural Revolutionary
and Mao the architect of “Chinese Marxism” – a Marxism that integrates theory with the circumstances of Chinese society. The essence of the
latter is encapsulated in “Mao Zedong Thought,” which is viewed as an expression not just of Mao the individual but of the collective leadership
of the Party. In most recent representations, “Chinese Marxism” is viewed as having developed in two phases: New Democracy, which brought
the Communist Party to power in 1949, and “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” inaugurated under Deng Xiaoping and developed under
his successors, and which represents a further development of Mao Zedong Thought. The Hu Jintao leadership has made an aggressive effort
to portray “Chinese Marxism” as the most advanced development of Marxism that might also serve as a model for others. These interpretive
operations have salvaged Mao for the national revolution and the legitimacy of the Communist Party. But it also presents a predicament in
keeping alive memories of Mao’s policies, which the Party is not always able to control in political memory, as has been illustrated most
recently in the Chongqing experiment.
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struction of Communist Party history and its ideological articulation in a
“Chinese Marxism,” which are structured around a distinction between a
Mao of the New Democratic Revolution and a Mao of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. These texts condemn Mao the Cultural Revolutionary but assign to the
Mao of New Democracy a foundational historical role, and to Mao Zedong
Thought a living historical significance as an expression of collective Party
identity. The distinction is ideological, made possible by the denial of the
history that links the two Maos. The texts point to a contradiction that may
be essential to grasping the political and ideological dynamics of the Party.
The appropriation of Mao for the reforms (to the point at the popular level
of making him into an object of consumption) suggests the possibility of
the return of the more radical Mao should the reforms run into trouble. This
may very well be the significance of the Chongqing experiment, as well as
what Wen Jiabao had in mind in his observations on a possible return of
Cultural Revolution-type disorder. What Wen did not say was that the con-
tradiction is inherent in the ideology that keeps Mao alive in the legitima-
tion of the Party, therefore risking the return of the radical Mao should it
lose its ability to sustain the distinction upon which it has gambled its ide-
ological credentials. (4) Being products of Party culture, Chinese leaders are
quite aware of the risks, even if the same culture might hold them back
from doing anything about it. (5)
Reform and the re-invention of Mao Zedong
Thought
Contrary to the impression left by the radical transformations since 1978,
the Chinese Communist Party has never officially repudiated Mao. Despite
the demotion he has suffered over the past three decades in and out of the
People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong continues to occupy a central place
in official and officially sponsored histories of the Chinese Revolution, its
past and present. Whatever personal feelings they may harbour, Chinese
leaders officially propagate the line that the Communist Party continues
the work that Mao started: to build a strong socialist state informed by a
Marxism that has been adjusted to national circumstances in keeping with
the demands of the times. As might be expected, they view this work as
having gotten under way sometime in the 1930s, then having gone astray
for more than two decades from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s with the
left-extremism of the Cultural Revolution before being revitalised by his
successors.
This official line has shown remarkable consistency since the post-Mao
regime reversed the policies of the Cultural Revolution, although it has un-
dergone elaboration and consolidation. Attitudes toward Mao have likewise
undergone shifts among the public, along with what officialdom has
deemed appropriate in celebrating Mao. But the basic line, and the justifi-
cation given for it, has remained much the same.
Continued fealty to Mao’s legacy despite the reversal of his radical policies
may be attributed at the most obvious level to the legitimacy needs of the
Communist Party. This no doubt is not far from the truth, but calls for more
in-depth exploration for what it may have to say about the Party’s ideolog-
ical self-representation. The Party claims the mantle of the revolution. Given
the prominent part Mao played in the revolution as its leader and chief the-
oretician, it would be rather a difficult task to uphold the historical signifi-
cance of the revolution and its achievements while repudiating his legacies.
The examples of Russia and Eastern Europe provide ample testimony of
what happens to the legacies of socialist revolutions once their founding
leaders have been discredited. The post-Mao leadership in China has avoided
this mistake despite, or perhaps because of, the upheaval it experienced dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, which made Party loyalty an over-
whelming consideration. As Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) would warn in 1980,
“When we write about his mistakes, we should not exaggerate, for otherwise
we shall be discrediting Chairman Mao Zedong, and this would mean dis-
crediting our Party and state.” (6)
Deng himself would lead the effort to reconstruct Party history to appro-
priate Mao for the reforms. Representations of Mao in the PRC and abroad
that are dominated by memories of the Cultural Revolution overlook that
there is more than one Maoist legacy available to the Party in the legitima-
tion of the revolutionary past: not only that of Mao the Cultural Revolu-
tionary but also of Mao the leader of the national revolution who gave voice
to the theoretical formulations of Marxism in defence of the pursuit of na-
tional aims: a “Chinese Marxism” growing out of the historical experience
of the Chinese Revolution. The current leadership projects its own under-
taking – and the 30 years of “reform and opening” under the successive
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4. There is a resonance between my argument here and some of the contributions to the recently
published (and suggestively titled) volume, Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry (ed.), Mao’s
Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China, Cambridge (MA), Har-
vard University Press, 2011. The contributors to this volume demonstrate the persistence of prac-
tices developed during the revolutionary years in contemporary political practices – from “guerrilla
policy style” to mass campaigns to willingness to experiment and learn from experience. With
the exception of one essay, the volume does not deal with issues of formal ideology, which is my
concern here. It is also in the realm of ideology that the contradictions of the regime are most
sharply visible.
5. In the 1980s, the distinguished literary critic coined the term “Mao style” to refer to a kind of
writing that characterised Party discourse, whether or not the writer sought to emulate Mao. This
“mechanical solidarity” may well be a manifestation of Party culture that persists. Frank Pieke is
one scholar who has explored this Party culture, with its contemporary transformations as well
as its persistence. See Frank Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s
China, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. For an interesting discussion of the persist-
ence in language, see Zhao Yuezhi, “Sustaining and Contesting Revolutionary Legacies in Media
and Ideology,” in Perry and Heilmann, Mao’s Invisible Hand, op. cit., pp. 201-236. Zhao argues
that new public relations methods are superimposed on Maoist language and controls. For “Mao
style,” see Li Tuo, “Resisting Writing,” in Liu Kang and Xiaobing Tang (ed.), Politics, Ideology and
Literary Discourse in Modern China: Theoretical Interventions and Cultural Critique, Durham (NC),
Duke University Press, 1993, pp. 273-277.
6. Deng Xiaoping, “Remarks on Successive Drafts of the ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the His-
tory of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China’” (hereafter, “Drafts”), in
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982 (hereafter, SWDXP), Beijing, Foreign Languages
Press, 1984, pp. 276-296, p. 287.
Special feature
Bronze statue at Yangjia Ling, Yan’an of the five party
leaders who set out from the Communist base at Yan’an to
take power as New China’s rulers.
© G.R. Barmé
leaderships of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin (江泽民) (but not Hu Yaobang
胡耀邦 and Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳) – as further developing the policies of
New Democracy that brought the Communist Party to power in 1949 under
Mao’s leadership. In this historical reconstruction, “socialism with Chinese
characteristics” (中国特色社会主义) as formulated by Deng Xiaoping and
enriched by his successors represents a second stage in the unfolding of
“Chinese Marxism,” of which New Democracy (新民主主义) under Mao was
the inaugural phase. The Cultural Revolution, sandwiched in between, serves
in the new history of “Chinese Marxism” as a period when the ideology went
astray (and a “negative example” from which to learn what not to do), but
it leaves Mao’s “true” legacy intact for his successors to follow up on once
this temporary deviation had been overcome.
The reinterpretation of Mao’s “correct” thought was especially important
at the beginning of the reform period, when there still were Maoists pow-
erful and popular enough to torpedo an abrupt reversal of the policies of
the Cultural Revolution and the ideological orientation that had guided
them. This consideration would gradually fade after the Tiananmen tragedy
of 1989. As reforms gained speed in the 1990s, now stimulated by a new
awareness of globalisation, Mao was no longer the threat he had been ear-
lier, as suggested by the regime’s mostly tolerant response to the “Mao
fever” (Mao Zedong re 毛泽东热) that accompanied the celebration of the
100th anniversary of Mao’s birth in 1993. It was also right around this time
that a serious rewriting of the first three decades of PRC history got under-
way, culminating in the Party history published only last year, in time for
the 90th anniversary of the Party’s founding. (7) This history, and works on
Chinese Marxism that have appeared only during the last two or three years,
have brought into focus an interpretive effort that traces its origins to the
reforms that put an end to Mao’s radical policies.
Mao, it may be recalled, was never officially repudiated. Indeed, the over-
throw of the “Gang of Four,” the termination of the Cultural Revolution, and
the turn to “reform and opening” with the historic Third Plenary Session of
the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 were viewed by the
Party leaders as the restoration of “the correct path of Marxism-Leninism
and Mao Zedong Thought.” (8) “Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
Thought” were enshrined in 1979 as one of the four “cardinal principles”
guiding the Party (in addition to “the socialist road,” “dictatorship of the
proletariat,” and “leadership of the Communist Party”). The final verdict
would be provided in the “Resolution on certain questions in the history of
our party since the founding of the People’s Republic of China” (hereafter,
1981 Resolution), which was endorsed by the Sixth Plenary Session of the
11th Central Committee in late June 1981. (9) This document, and the dis-
cussions that attended it, were in hindsight among the foundational docu-
ments of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” (10) Supplemented by
pronouncements from Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) whose policies
are viewed as further developments of Chinese Marxism, they have served
as a template for writing the history of Marxism in China – and Mao into
that history.
The 1981 Resolution held Mao directly responsible for the leftist errors of
the Cultural Revolution, but concluded nevertheless:
Comrade Mao Zedong was a great Marxist and a great proletarian
revolutionary, strategist and theorist. It is true that he made gross
mistakes during the “cultural  revolution,” but if we judge his activities
as a whole, his contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweigh
his mistakes. His merits are primary and his errors secondary. He ren-
dered indelible meritorious service in founding and building up our
Party and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, in winning victory
for the cause of liberation of the Chinese people, in founding the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, and in advancing our socialist cause. He made
major contributions to the liberation of the oppressed nations of the
world and to the progress of mankind. (11)
Deng Xiaoping’s account of the successive drafts of the 1981 Resolution
leaves little question that this conclusion was reached after considerable
disagreement and deliberation within the Party. (12) How the “Resolution”
manoeuvred its way through the Cultural Revolution, weighed Mao’s errors
against his achievements, and balanced the mistakes of the Cultural Revo-
lution against past achievements has been discussed by other scholars. (13)
What is of interest in the document for our purposes here is its historical
delineation of Mao as the Party’s leader, and its relationship to Mao Zedong
Thought and Chinese Marxism. Mao Zedong’s achievements as leader from
the mid-thirties to the mid-fifties were indisputable. He had led the Party
to victory in the New Democratic Revolution, opened up a new historical
era by liberating China, and overseen the transition to socialism completed
by 1956. Even after his radical left-turn shortly after the Eighth Party Con-
gress in 1956, he had continued to make important contributions to China’s
development right through the Cultural Revolution, when his mistakes were
at their most destructive. Throughout, he had continued to produce theo-
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7. Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi (中共中央党史研究室) (CCP Central Party History Of-
fice), Zhongguo gongchandang lishi (中国共产党历史, History of the Chinese Communist Party),
2 vols., Beijing, Zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi, vol. 1, 2002 / vol. 2, 2011. The first volume, edited
by Hu Sheng (胡绳) and Hu Qiaomu (胡乔木), was based with revisions on a 1991 volume of
the same title covering the years before 1949. It was published as a two-part set, covering re-
spectively 1921-1937 and 1937-1949. In addition to new materials utilised, its main revisions
were prompted by post-1991 speeches by Deng Xiaoping and, more significantly, the new leader
Jiang Zemin’s “important thought of ‘three represents.’” (see “Afterword,” Part 2, pp. 1051-1055).
The second volume of 2011 was also published as a two-volume set, each roughly 500 pp. cov-
ering, respectively, the years 1949-1958 and 1958-1978. See the interview with a former vice-
director of the Office, Zhang Qihua (张启华), who oversaw successive revisions of the text, in
Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan (中国新闻周刊) (China News Weekly), excerpted in “Zhonggong dan-
gshi chengren sannian ziran zaihai 1000 duo wan ren siwang” (中共党史承认三年自然害灾
1000多万人死亡, CPC Party History acknowledges deaths of more than 10 million during the 3-
year natural disaster), Cenews.eu, 14 January 2011, http://www.cenews/?p=28441 (consulted on
8 May 2012). Hereafter, Zhang Qihua.
8. Deng Xiaoping, “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles” (30 March 1979), in SWDXP, pp. 166-191,
p. 167. 
9. “Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s Republic
of China” (hereafter, Resolution), adopted on 27 June 1981, Chinese Communism Subject Archive,
http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm (consulted on 30 April 2012).
10. In an essay published in 1986, Brantly Womack suggested that the 1981 Resolution was compa-
rable in significance to a similar document produced in 1945, “Resolution on Certain Questions
in the History of Our Party.” The latter provided an account of the Party’s history since 1921,
foregrounding the role of Mao, who in the Seventh Party Congress in 1945 was anointed undis-
puted leader of the Party and emblem of Mao Zedong Thought. The 1981 Resolution, which in its
concluding paragraph did indeed refer to the 1945 Resolution as its antecedent, laid the ground-
work for the writing of Party history for the 1949-1978 period. Womack’s suggestion is confirmed
in recent historical work, which consistently refers to this document as a primary guideline. See
Brantly Womack, “Where Mao Went Wrong: Epistemology and Ideology in Mao’s Leftist Politics,”
The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 16, July 1986, pp. 23-40. In his speech on the occasion
of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CCP on 1 July 2011, Hu Jintao once again referred
to the two resolutions as storehouses of the Party’s “experiences and lessons.” Hu Jintao, “Speech
at CPC Anniversary Gathering,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
07/01/c_13960505_6.htm (consulted on 30 April 2012), 17 pages, p. 6.
11. “Resolution,” p. 34
12. Deng, “Drafts,” is an invaluable testament to inner-Party negotiation in producing this important
document. As I shall note below, the Party history published 30 years later went through similar
negotiation, this time extending over 15 years!
13. Womack, “Where Mao Went Wrong,” op. cit.; John Bryan Starr, “‘Good Mao’, ‘Bad Mao’: Mao Stud-
ies and the Re-Evaluation of Mao’s Political Thought,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs,
no. 16, July 1986, pp. 1-6; Nick Knight, “The Form of Mao Zedong’s ‘Sinification’ of Marxism,” The
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 9, January 1983, pp. 17-33.
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retical work that was quite significant in contributing to socialist recon-
struction. As the quotation above indicates, there was no questioning his
role as the leader of the Chinese Revolution.
The most interesting part of the 1981 Resolution related to Mao Zedong
Thought. The “Resolution” reaffirmed the distinction between Mao’s thought
and the Mao Zedong Thought that had been part of Party ideology since
the origins of that formulation in the early 1940s. (14) One referred to the
thinking of an individual leader, the other to the crystallisation of the col-
lective wisdom of the Party’s revolutionary experience as articulated by the
leader of the Party. What it had to say is worth quoting at some length be-
cause of its implications not only for placing Mao in the ideological recon-
struction in the past, but also for the part Mao Zedong Thought would play
in the unfolding of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”:
The Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief
representative, made a theoretical synthesis of China’s unique expe-
rience in its protracted revolution in accordance with the basic prin-
ciples of Marxism-Leninism. This synthesis constituted a scientific
system of guidelines befitting China’s conditions, and it is this syn-
thesis which is Mao Zedong Thought, the product of the integration
of the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete
practice of the Chinese revolution. Making revolution in a large East-
ern semi-colonial, semi-feudal country….cannot be solved by reciting
the general principles of Marxism-Leninism or by copying foreign ex-
perience in every detail. The erroneous tendency of making Marxism
a dogma and deifying Comintern resolutions and the experience of
the Soviet Union prevailed in the international communist move-
ment and in our Party mainly in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and
this tendency pushed the Chinese revolution to the brink of total fail-
ure. It was in the course of combating this wrong tendency and mak-
ing a profound summary of our historical experience in this respect
that Mao Zedong Thought took shape and developed. It was system-
atized and extended in a variety of fields and reached maturity in
the latter part of the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the War of Re-
sistance Against Japan, and it was further developed during the War
of Liberation and after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
Mao Zedong Thought is Marxism-Leninism applied and developed in
China; it constitutes a correct theory, a body of correct principles and
a summary of the experiences that have been confirmed in the prac-
tice of the Chinese revolution, a crystallization of the collective wis-
dom of the Chinese Communist Party. (15)
The identification of Mao Zedong Thought with the collective wisdom of
the Party rather than Mao the individual suggested not only that it was pos-
sible for Mao, the leader, to transgress against Mao Zedong Thought, but
also that Mao Zedong Thought was a work in progress, “still in the process
of development” after the passing of Mao, the leader. (16) There was a danger
here, too, that the Party might be culpable for the wrong turn that the ide-
ology had taken during the two decades of deviation, which was indeed
conceded by the document. (17) On the other hand, Mao Zedong Thought
as the expression of the collective leadership of the Party has been elevated
to a plane where it leads an unblemished existence beyond the errors of in-
dividual leaders, having demonstrated repeatedly its ability to correct its
mistakes. Making mistakes was inevitable for living people, Mao himself had
stated in 1945, adding that only the unborn and the dead don’t make mis-
takes. He had admitted to the many mistakes he and others (including Marx
and Engels) had made in the course of revolutionary activity. But when Mao
Zedong Thought was enshrined in the Seventh Party Congress of that year,
those mistakes were excluded. Likewise in the present the mistakes Mao
had made in his later years must be excluded from Mao Zedong Thought
to preserve the latter’s status as the infallible guide to socialist reconstruc-
tion. (18)
To recall a distinction Franz Schurmann has drawn in his study of ideology
in the PRC, Mao Zedong Thought is given an abstract existence and a
longevity in these discussions that raises it almost to the status of an “ide-
ology” of universal significance rather than a “thought” that represents the
concrete practice of the ideology. (19) As the 1981 “Resolution” framed it:
Mao Zedong Thought is the valuable spiritual asset of our Party. It
will be our guide to action for a long time to come….While many of
Comrade Mao Zedong’s important works were written during the pe-
riods of new-democratic revolution and of socialist transformation,
we must still constantly study them. This is not only because one
cannot cut the past off from the present and failure to understand
the past will hamper our understanding of present-day problems, but
also because many of the basic theories, principles and scientific ap-
proaches set forth in these works are of universal significance and
provide us with invaluable guidance now and will continue to do so
in the future…. Mao Zedong Thought has added much that is new
to the treasure-house of Marxist-Leninist theory. We must combine
our study of the scientific works of Comrade Mao Zedong with that
of the scientific writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. (20)
The greatest achievement of Mao Zedong Thought was its integration of
universal Marxist theory and concrete Chinese practice. In 1980, Deng Xi-
aoping insisted that “it is precisely Mao Zedong Thought that the present
Central Committee upholds, only we have given it concrete content.” (21) The
statement elevates Mao Zedong Thought to an ideological plane comparable
to that of Marxism-Leninism, but at the same time evacuates it of any sub-
stantial content, which also increasingly has come to characterise the rela-
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14. See, Raymond F. Wiley, The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung, Ch’en Po-ta and the Search for
Chinese Theory, 1935-1945, Stanford (CA), Stanford University Press, 1980.
15. “Resolution,” pp. 34-35
16. Deng, “Drafts,” in SWDXP, op. cit., p. 282. The “Resolution” stated that the “erroneous ‘Left’ theses,
upon which Comrade Mao Zedong based himself in initiating the “cultural revolution,” were ob-
viously inconsistent with the system of Mao Zedong Thought, which is the integration of the uni-
versal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution,” p. 19.
17. See also Deng, “Drafts,” p. 281.
18. Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi yishi (ed.), “‘Zhongguo gongchandang lishi (shangjuan)’
ruogan wenti shuoming” (“中国共产党历史[上卷]若干问题说明 Explaining some questions in
the first volume of the History of the Communist Party of China), Beijing, Zhonggong dangshi
chuban she, 1991, pp. 211-213. This interesting volume, published as a companion volume to the
Party history published in 1991, was devoted to clarification of unresolved problems in the History.
The clarifications were used also to comment on contemporary issues. In addition to this expli-
cation of the relationship between Mao and Mao Zedong Thought, the volume also drew attention
to the Communist Party’s struggles with bourgeois thinking in the 1920s, and its parallels with
the struggles against advocates of bourgeois economics and politics since the beginning of Reform
and Opening (pp. 20-21). See also Mei Rongzheng (梅荣政, chief editor), Makesizhuyi Zhong-
guohua shi (马克思主义中国化史 History of making Marxism Chinese), Beijing, Social Sciences
Publication Press, 2010, p. 633, where the author cites Deng Xiaoping to the effect that “Mao Ze-
dong’s mistakes late in life do not belong to Mao Zedong Thought.”
19. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, new enlarged edition, Berkeley
(CA), University of California Press, 1968, esp. pp. 24-58.
20. “Resolution,” op. cit., p. 45.
21. Deng, “Drafts,” in SWDXP, op. cit., p. 283.
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tionship of Chinese Marxism to Marxism. The development of the Chinese
Communist Party beginning with Mao’s leadership in the 1930s has become
at one and the same time the historical unfolding of “Chinese Marxism,” with
ever fewer references to the theoretical sources it claims as its ancestral ori-
gins. In other words, its Marxism has become increasingly self-referential. (22)
In addition to the example it provided in the appropriate handling of Marx-
ism in the national revolution, the reaffirmation of Mao Zedong Thought
under Deng Xiaoping had a second, more concrete, significance. Mao Ze-
dong Thought was formulated and reached its fullness in the course of the
New Democratic revolution, of which it was the ideological expression.
Hence its evocation also invoked the question of the relevance of its policies
following the elimination of the leftist zeal of the Cultural Revolution. I have
suggested elsewhere that there was much in common initially between re-
form policies after 1978 and policies of New Democracy that had brought
the Communist Party to power: a coalition government under the leadership
of the Communist Party and the “dictatorship of the proletariat”; a mixed
economy blending private national capital and state management and di-
rection (bureaucratic capital); and a culture policy that sought to integrate
a new Communist culture with native legacies, especially popular culture. (23)
Theoretically speaking, reforms after 1978 picked up where the Eighth Con-
ference in 1956 had left off, when the transition to socialism had been com-
pleted. As the 1981 Resolution stated in the section just quoted, however,
while New Democracy belonged to an earlier phase of the revolution, it was
the foundation of Mao Zedong Thought, and its documents would retain
their significance for the foreseeable future. It is quite clear in hindsight that
the reforms initiated in the 1980s would ultimately go back past 1956 to
the mixed policies of New Democracy, especially in economic policy. Cul-
tural policy has abandoned Mao’s stress on popular culture as the source
of a new culture except in its more theatrical forms, and there has been a
revival of elite traditions reminiscent of Kuomintang (guomindang 国民党)
policies in the 1930s. It is only in the consolidation of Communist Party rule
and “the dictatorship of the proletariat” (albeit independently of the latter)
that reform policies would go beyond the provisions of the 1956 conference.
In an essay published in 1999, the distinguished historian Hu Sheng (head
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences between 1985 and 1998)
pointed out that New Democracy was very important for understanding
“socialism with Chinese characteristics.” (24) Hu at the time (until his death
in 2000) was also in charge of the group working on the official History of
the Chinese Communist Party since 1949 published last year. (25)
The re-evaluation of Mao Zedong Thought in 1980-1981 set the stage for
the part Mao was to play in official historiography since then. It is worth
stressing here two dimensions of this re-evaluation. On the one hand, Mao
Zedong Thought was associated intimately with the policies of New
Democracy that had prevailed for two decades between the mid-thirties
and the mid-fifties, and therefore belonged to the past of the Party. On the
other hand, as the foundation for a Chinese Marxism that would continue
to develop for the foreseeable future, Mao Zedong Thought transcended its
times, and lived on in Party ideology as a guide to the future of socialism.
In his ninetieth anniversary speech in 2011, Hu Jintao reiterated this double
temporality of Mao Zedong Thought when he stated:
The Party has consistently integrated the basic tenets of Marxism
with the specific conditions of China, and it has made two great the-
oretical achievements in the historical process of adapting Marxism
to China’s conditions. One is Mao Zedong Thought, which represents
the application and development of Marxism-Leninism in China. Mao
Zedong Thought has resolved in a systematic way the issue of how
to accomplish the new-democratic revolution and socialist revolu-
tion in China, a big semi-colonial and semi-feudal country in the East,
and made painstaking effort to explore the issue of what kind of so-
cialism China should build and how to build it, thereby making new
and creative contributions to enriching Marxism. The other theoret-
ical achievement is the system of theories of socialism with Chinese
characteristics. This is a scientific theoretical system consisting of
Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents,
the Scientific Outlook on Development and other major strategic
thoughts…. The system of theories of socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics represents the continuation and development of Mao Ze-
dong Thought. (26)
Mao Zedong Thought represented the integration of Marxist theory
with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. It was not merely
the application of Marxism to the Chinese revolution, but also added
“new content” (xinde neirong 新的内容) to Marxism and enriched it the-
oretically. (27) Reference to Marxism has remained as a basic tenet of the
Party’s practice, but Mao Zedong Thought itself has come to represent
“a new stage of Marxism” for the Party to refer back to as a theoretical
basis for practice in the new circumstances that it faced. It is worth not-
ing also that however strenuously the Party sought to distinguish be-
tween Mao and Mao Zedong Thought, it could not (or would not) take
Mao the person out of the thought so long as it insisted on that particular
formulation.
Mao in official historiography
Over the last three decades, official histories of the revolution have fol-
lowed closely the line established in the 1981 Resolution. The editors of a
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three-volume Party history written for the required course on Marxism-
Leninism at the Party School, published in 1990 (preface dated 1987), wrote:
This book follows the correct line established at the Third Plenary
Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, and has been written ac-
cording to the spirit of “The Resolution on Certain Questions in the
History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of
China” at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Commit-
tee. It applies the viewpoints of dialectical and historical materialism,
is based on historical facts, and seeks truth from facts. (28)
Ideological requirements in the composition of Party history would be-
come more complicated in ensuing years with the addition to Deng Xi-
aoping’s “theory” of Jiang Zemin’s “important thought of ‘Three
Represents’” (“三个代表”重要思想) and Hu Jintao’s “scientific outlook on
development” (科学发展观), but the basic line has remained unchanged.
The first volume of the most recent official Party history published in 2002
reiterated its faithfulness to the same principles, but added to it Jiang
Zemin’s take on the revolution. The second volume published in 2011 ad-
ditionally bears the stamp of Hu Jintao. But since every leader has reaf-
firmed the 1981 Resolution as a fundamental document of reform, the
Resolution has been basic to their evaluations of the past as well. Zhang
Qihua pointed to the 1981 Resolution as the primary guide to the writing
of the second volume of the Party history published in 1911. In the words
of the editors, the guiding principles in writing the volume were:
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the
important thought of “Three Represents,” deep and comprehensive
pursuit of the scientific outlook on development, grasping important
historical questions on the basis of the “Resolution on Certain Ques-
tions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s
Republic of China,” decisions of important meetings of the Party, and
important directives of leading comrades of the Party Centre. (29)
The guidance was not just theoretical. While all officially sanctioned work
acknowledges an arduous production process, this volume was particularly
significant because of the sensitive issues it addressed of the post-New
Democracy turn to the left in the transition to socialism and its culmination
in the Cultural Revolution. It took nearly two decades to complete. Work
on it began immediately after the publication in 1991 of volume 1 (subse-
quently revised for republication in 2002), (30) which covered the period from
the founding of the Party in 1921 to the victory of New Democracy in 1949.
According to the editor’s account, it was vetted repeatedly by relevant
scholars and Party leaders, and went through numerous revisions before it
was finally approved for publication in 2011, in time for the Party’s ninetieth
anniversary. (31)
These works are based on documentation not available to outsiders. What
they have to say about specific historical matters in Mao’s life and activities
may be taken up by specialists on those matters. What is of interest here is
the delineation of Mao’s place in the revolution and Chinese Marxism. Be-
ginning with the 1981 Resolution to the production of the histories of the
revolution and the Communist Party, a generally accepted periodisation of
the revolution has come into focus: a New Democratic phase when Mao
played a leading role in coalition politics, economic flexibility, and military
strategy as “representative” (daibiao  代表) (32) of the collective leadership
of the Party; a Cultural Revolution phase (of over two decades) when Mao’s
leftist inclinations toward hasty development, socialist purity, and class
struggle led the revolution astray; and a third phase when, under the suc-
cessive leaderships of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, a regime
of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was established to guide the
country through the initial phase of socialism, which is likely to last over a
century. (33)
This periodisation is evident with greatest clarity in discussions of Mao
Zedong Thought. A recently published volume, (34) also intended as a text-
book for the required course on Marxism at the Party School, organises the
development of Chinese Marxism in two stages, with the first stage serving
as the foundation for the second: New Democracy from the mid-thirties to
the mid-fifties, with Mao as its moving spirit, and “socialism with Chinese
characteristics,” theorised most importantly by Deng Xiaoping after 1978
but with subsequent accretions. Mao Zedong Thought, the emblem of Chi-
nese Marxism and the product of the Party’s revolutionary practice, emerged
during the first period in the Party’s integration of Marxism-Leninism with
the concrete realities of revolutionary practice in “semi-feudal semi-colo-
nial” Chinese society. It was not merely an application of theory to Chinese
society; it opened up a new theoretical vista on Marxism in economically
and politically backward societies suffering from colonialist aggression. (35)
Mao Zedong Thought was betrayed during the Cultural Revolution by Mao
himself, when in his left turn he began to ignore the circumstances of Chi-
nese society, broadened the scope of class struggle, and turned the masses
against the Party. (36) Mao nevertheless continued to make contributions to
Mao Zedong Thought in the areas of development and international rela-
tions. It was most importantly the Party and the people, however, who kept
it alive, and restored it to its rightful place after 1978. The restoration of
the correct line of Mao Zedong Thought was accompanied by a second
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“great leap” in Chinese Marxism equal in significance to the emergence of
Mao Zedong Thought that produced “socialism with Chinese characteris-
tics,” beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s theory and proceeding through Jiang
Zemin’s “Three Represents” and Hu Jintao’s scientific outlook on develop-
ment. It remains a work in progress in “the continuation and development
of Mao Zedong Thought.” (37)
This interpretation of Mao in the history of the revolution is a far cry from
that of the Cultural Revolution, which had rendered Mao “the helmsman”
of the revolution, and class struggle the core principle of Mao Zedong
Thought (and Marxism). If Mao Zedong comes anywhere close under the
new historical regime to the revolutionary sagacity attributed to him earlier,
it is for the first phase of the revolution before 1949. Even then, the em-
phasis currently is on Mao “the representative” of the Party, who kept class
struggle in moderation and recognised the significance of the forces of pro-
duction to keep the revolution moving forward. At the same time, Mao is
now held to account for what happened during the Cultural Revolution. Vol-
ume 2 of the History of the Communist Party of China, and a number of
officially-sanctioned works on Chinese Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought
published during the last couple of years, usually under the rubric of Make-
sizhuyide Zhongguohua (making Marxism Chinese), have broken the taboo
on the discussion of the Cultural Revolution now that some agreement has
been reached in the Party over the appropriate verdict that does the least
damage to the Party. (38) Previous histories, such as the 1990 history men-
tioned above, either stopped short of the turn to the left in the late 1950s,
or simply blanked out the period between 1952 and 1978, as in the film
produced on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the
People’s Republic in 1999 or in the current historical display at the New
Museum of National History.
The gap is now being filled through historical work more open to confronting
sensitive issues in the Party’s past. What is genuinely new in these recent texts
is not so much the overall interpretation, which largely follows the decisions
of the 1981 Resolution, but the discussion in some detail of the period from
the mid-1950s to 1978, and Mao’s leading role in the developments surround-
ing the Cultural Revolution. Mao, the individual, does not fare well in this ac-
count, although criticism of his “left-deviation” after 1952 is much more
measured than that to be found in some of the more incriminating works
published outside of China. Beginning with the “transition to socialism” after
1952, Mao began to ignore the circumstances of Chinese society that were
nowhere close enough to fulfilling the conditions for socialism, but also
wrongly shifted emphasis in his reading of Marxism from the primacy of the
forces of production to continued class struggle. His anxieties about capitalist
restoration led to the persecution of so-called “revisionists,” inflicting immense
harm on the Party. In the verdict of the new Party history:
As the important leader of the Party and the state, Mao Zedong can-
not but bear the major responsibility for the serious and comprehen-
sive errors of “the cultural revolution.” The power of the Party was
excessively concentrated in one person, Mao Zedong’s erroneous
“leftist” leadership replaced the collective leadership of the Party, and
the worship of the individual reached an insane level, undermining
the possibility of the Party and the state to prevent and control the
initiation and development of “the cultural revolution.” (39)
The authors continue to observe, nevertheless, that the perpetuation of
the Cultural Revolution for ten years provides prima facie evidence that it
should not be blamed solely on one individual. Not only did many in the
Party support Mao’s line, but so did the people at large, who were still under
the sway of the feudal practices of the past.
This is indeed the general approach to the evaluation of Mao Zedong in
recent histories: he was responsible for what happened, but the responsi-
bility must be shared by others, including other leaders in the Party. This
was the case also with the communisation and Great Leap Forward move-
ments of 1958-1960, which are officially acknowledged for the first time
to have cost more than ten million lives. As the Party history puts it:
In launching “the great leap forward,” Mao Zedong’s hope initially
was to change as quickly as possible the visage of poverty and back-
wardness, and to truly advance and strengthen China to establish its
place among the world’s nations. This was at one with the hopes
prevalent among large numbers of cadres and the people. The prob-
lem was that it went against the line of seeking truth from facts that
the Party promoted…exaggerated the uses of subjective will and ef-
fort, advocated leap-frogging over historical stages in purpose and
policy, and created in practical work a situation that went against
natural and economic laws. This kind of hot-headedness was not re-
stricted to Mao Zedong; it was a prevalent attitude among central
leaders and many cadres… (40)
If others shared in Mao’s errors, Mao himself was not completely given to
the leftist line he had let loose, but made repeated efforts to correct his
mistakes – as in the retreat from the communes after 1960, his purge of
Lin Biao (林彪), his criticism in the 1970s of Jiang Qing (江青), and the move
forward during the same decade to a moderate modernisation program
(“The Four Modernizations”). China had registered economic and techno-
logical achievements during the Cultural Revolution, and there were impor-
tant achievements in foreign relations. Mao continued to contribute to
these advances through his theoretical writings. The greatest credit for these
achievements must nevertheless go to the Party and the people who pre-
served their loyalty to Mao Zedong Thought against all adversity. (41)
Admitting the Party’s spiritual and political complicity in Mao Zedong’s
policies is, from everything we know, true to the spirit and the politics of
the times, but that does not make it easily acceptable to those who suffered
from his policies personally, or to those who for one reason or another
would discredit Mao. The latter probably were the ones Deng Xiaoping in
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1980 repeatedly enjoined not to exaggerate Chairman Mao’s shortcomings,
and those whose disagreements may account for the nearly two decades it
took to bring the recent Party History to its final form. The admission makes
the Party and many Party leaders complicit in the leftist zeal that culmi-
nated in these deplorable events.
And yet, this is very much in line with the Party’s intentions in choosing
from a variety of representation of the past: not to condemn Mao and jeop-
ardise the legitimacy the Party draws from the revolutionary past, but rather
to provide “lessons” with which to guide the Party into the future. The ac-
count of Party history is replete with struggles against the “right” and the
“left,” more with the latter than with the former. The lessons of New
Democracy are drawn out to stress the present day importance of the
united front line, a mixed economy, respect for the past, etc. The Great Leap
Forward provides the occasion for stressing the priority of the forces over
the relations of production – in other words, class. The Cultural Revolution
in its disorderliness provides proof of the centrality of unified Party leader-
ship to national progress and welfare. It even had a bright side in preparing
the Party for “socialism with Chinese characteristics” after 1978. The con-
clusions drawn in the texts after every major episode of Party history are
not just summaries but also guides to the reading of the text and the correct
“lesson” to be drawn from it.
The recently published history concludes with a chapter, “The great
achievements and basic experiences of socialist revolution and construction
led by the Party,” that outlines the lessons to be drawn from the six decades
of Party history covered in the text. The achievements range from finally
unifying the country and bringing together the various nationalities to live
in peace, to poverty alleviation, to the establishment of foreign relations
and national defence to secure the safety of the nation. Of the lessons to
be drawn from the experience, the centrality of economic development and
advancing the forces of production take top priority. There is a reminder
that sovereignty and self-reliance are preconditions of opening up to the
world. In either case, a stable and consolidated Party leadership remains the
guarantee for the country’s future. (42)
A spectral presence: Mao and the Party
Mao Zedong leads a double existence in post-revolutionary China. Mao
the individual remains a national icon for the role he played in national lib-
eration and consolidation. This is the most widely shared image of Mao. In
the official line, he is portrayed as the representative of the collective lead-
ership that achieved the victory of the New Democratic revolution in 1949,
and initiated the transition to socialism that was completed between 1952
and 1956. It is also the pervasive popular image of Mao propagated in pop-
ular consciousness through education and the popular media. (43) It is likely
that these days the majority of the population knows Mao mostly by the
endless series of TV movies on the national revolution and the Anti-Japanese
War in which Mao figures prominently.
There is also the Mao who was responsible for the Cultural Revolution,
who is apparently still controversial. In the official line since 1978, Mao has
been held responsible for the Cultural Revolution, although it took 30 years
for this responsibility to be spelled out in any detail. A decision was made
under Deng Xiaoping not to repudiate Mao as Joseph Stalin had been repu-
diated in the Soviet Union in 1956, perhaps because Mao was more like a
combination of V.I. Lenin and Stalin in stature, and could not be repudiated
without irreparably damaging the revolution and the Party. The official line
remains ambivalent in stressing the “good” sides of Mao even during the
Cultural Revolution. Mao made serious leftist errors, but they were exacer-
bated by the behind-the-scenes machinations of the Jiang Qing and Lin
Biao cliques. Mao was not above recognising and trying to rectify his errors.
He played some part in the progress during those years in the economy,
technology, and foreign relations, in addition to producing theoretical doc-
uments of lasting value. The Party has been quick to suppress any expression
of excessive zeal for Mao and his policies, but it also has been cautious in
condemning Mao, even as it has reversed his radical policies. Even more so
than in the popular celebrations of Mao referred to above, this ambivalence
has been apparent in renewed experiments with “redness,” among which
the so-called Chongqing Model by the “princeling” Bo Xilai is the most
prominent (see fn. 45).
Rather than repudiate Mao, the current interpretation seeks to appropriate
his image for its own “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” This is appar-
ent in two important ways. One is the historical linkage between New
Democracy and “socialism with Chinese characteristics” that was fore-
grounded with the bracketing of the Cultural Revolution as an episode in
socialist development. The other is the institutionalisation of Mao Zedong
Thought. In official ideology Mao Zedong Thought occupies a crucial role
as the fountainhead of “Chinese Marxism.”
Interestingly, since Mao Zedong Thought emerged in the midst of the
New Democratic revolution, it bears upon it the stamp of both the policies
and the theoretical achievements of that phase of the revolution. I have
referred above to what these policies generally implied, and how the con-
siderations that had given rise to them would also provide the reform
leadership with its initial inspiration. That they were now premised upon
a post-socialist situation called for further elaboration of Mao Zedong
Thought in keeping with the times. According to the current interpreta-
tion, there have been two important periods in the making of Chinese
Marxism: the New Democracy period and “socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics,” which represented another “revolutionary great leap” in mak-
ing Marxism Chinese. The Mao Zedong Thought the Party restored in 1978
returned it to its “true” spirit, that of New Democracy, premised upon
class alliance (united front) and development of the forces of production
as the primary goals. This was the Mao legacy Deng Xiaoping drew upon
to formulate “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” One work writes
more strongly that “Deng Xiaoping theory was nourished within the womb
of Mao Zedong Thought” (yunyu yu Mao Zedong sixiang zhong 孕育于毛
泽东思想中). (44)
The appropriation of Mao for the reforms was a much more astute move
than repudiating Mao Zedong Thought. According to Maurice Meisner, the
Eighth Party Congress in 1956 presided over by Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) and
Deng Xiaoping had deleted “the phrase ‘guided by the thought of Mao Tse-
tung’” from the new party constitution in order “to reinforce the new prin-
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44. Song Shichang and Nong Fang, Makesizhuyi Zhongguohua tonglun, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 19. It is dif-
ficult to say if there is an analogy here to what Marx had to say about the dialectics of one mode
of production growing out of another. If there is, it would suggest that Deng Xiaoping Theory was
a product but also a negation of Mao Zedong Thought, which would make more sense in terms
of a non-dialectical reading of the discourse as product of Mao Zedong Thought but negation of
the Mao elements in it.
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ciple of collective leadership.” (45) The deletion had been viewed by cultural
revolutionaries subsequently as further evidence of Deng Xiaoping’s under-
handed opposition to Mao. This time around, Deng recruited Mao for the
reforms, while alleviating the anxieties of those within and without the Party
who continued to be loyal to the revolution Mao had represented. More to
the point here, by claiming Mao for his innovations, Deng incorporated Mao
into his theory, which has since been passed down to “the important
thought of ‘three represents’” and “the scientific outlook on development.”
In other words, New Democracy was one phase in the formulation of Chi-
nese Marxism, but this first phase has been both a foundation and a para-
digm for its subsequent development. (46) These are the two temporalities
of Mao Zedong Thought: one that relegates it to the past, as an expression
of New Democracy that now has been superseded; the other a long-term
reference for Chinese Marxism. In this perspective, there is hardly anything
ideologically radical about the recent call by the prominent Party intellec-
tual (and another “princeling”) Zhang Musheng (张木生) to return to the
social and political policies of New Democracy to resolve contemporary
problems of development. At the same time, if there is an affinity between
New Democracy and “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” as the lead-
ership has claimed, it is unlikely that New Democracy would resolve prob-
lems presented by a developmental trajectory of its inspiration. Indeed, as
I observed above, ignoring the part contradictions created by New Democ-
racy may have played in the radical turn of the mid-fifties is a significant
shortcoming of Party histories anxious to represent the Cultural Revolution
as an irresponsible deviation. (47)
Similarly, in discussions of Chinese Marxism Party leaders continue to ref-
erence Mao for their theoretical and policy innovations. A vague but poten-
tially quite significant development in recent discussions of Chinese
Marxism is their self-referentiality. Recently published studies of Chinese
Marxism read mostly as histories of policy innovations by successive gen-
erations of Communist leaders that are now endowed with theoretical sta-
tus in the formulation of a Chinese Marxism. There is little visible concern
in these texts for theoretical discussions that critically engage issues of
Marxist theory with reference to Deng Xiaoping’s theory, “the important
thought of ‘Three Represents,’” or “the scientific outlook on development.”
Rather, each references predecessors in its ancestral lineage, “building” on
them to further develop Chinese Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought. Mao’s
theoretical corpus from New Democracy days, and even some produced
after his left deviation, are part of the theoretical corpus of the Party.
Theory itself endlessly changes in response to the times and national
needs. In the words of Hu Jintao in his ninetieth anniversary speech to the
Party:
The development of practice, cognition of the truth, and innovation of
theories know no boundary. The practice of the Party and the people keeps
progressing, so should the theories guiding it. The path of socialism with
N o . 2 0 1 2 / 2  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 25
45. Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China: A History of the People’s Republic, New York, The Free Press, 1977,
p. 182. This was in the midst of the criticism of Joseph Stalin and hero worship in the Soviet Union,
and conflicts within the Chinese Communist Party over agrarian reform policies. It is also indicative
of the intimate link between Mao Zedong Thought and Mao’s thought that defies efforts to de-
personalise the former.
46. Mei Rongzheng, Makesizhuyi Zhongguohua shi, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
47. The reference here is to Zhang Musheng, Gaizao womende wenhua lishi guan (改造我门的文化
历史观 Reforming our cultural historical outlook), Beijing, Military Science Publications, 2011.
For the stir created by the book’s call to New Democracy, see, David Bandurski, “Turning back to
‘New Democracy’?”, China Media Project, posted 19 May 2011, http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/05/
19/12486/ (consulted on 30 April 2012); and Chris Buckley, “Exclusive: Party insider maps bold
path for China’s next leaders,” Reuters.com, 18 August 2011, http://www.reuters.com/assets/
print?aid=USTRE77H11R20110818 (consulted on 30 April 2012). See also the interview with
Zhang, “Zhang Musheng: Zai ju xinminzhuzhuyi daqi” (张木生:再举新民主主义大旗Once again
raise the great banner of New Democracy), Southern News Network, 31 October 2011, 9 pp.,
http://nf.nfdaily.cn/nfrwzk/content/2011-10/31/content_32350892.htm (consulted on 30 April
2012). Zhang is firmly committed to Communist Party leadership, advocates intra-Party democ-
racy, and greater democratisation of politics with an emphasis on home-grown democracy, which
he argues is to be found in New Democracy. It seems to me that the controversial aspect of
Zhang’s ideas may be due not to his advocacy of New Democracy as such but to a version of the
latter that stresses the revolutionary spirit of “the Yan’an Way” against the reigning Party “ortho-
doxy” preoccupied with the development of the forces of production, its call for the Party to re-
ground itself in the worker and peasant classes, its criticism of inequality, its condemnation of
the Party for having turned away from these principles of New Democracy beginning in the 1990s
(corresponding to the Jiang Zemin leadership, which brought capitalists into the Party), and its
advocacy of contentious politics. These issues are also entangled in conflicts among Party
“princelings” (the descendants of prominent revolutionaries) as well as between the “princelings”
and those who have worked their way up from the bottom. Indeed, the Chongqing experiment
and Zhang’s call for a return to New Democracy may be viewed as variant responses to the same
problems, the one advocating a greater role for the public in politics, the other re-politicisation
under Party leadership with closer attention to socially equitable development. Despite its Cultural
Revolutionary appearance, the Chongqing experiment would seem to be a highly controlled affair
to avoid the dreaded chaos stirred up by the former. Zhang Musheng, who expresses a preference
for the terms “Chongqing exploration” (重庆探索 ) or “Chongqing road” (重庆之路 ) over
“Chongqing Model,” notes its affinity to cultural practices in Yan’an (“Interview,” p. 8). It also has
affinities to New Democracy, and through it, to developmental ideas going back to Sun Yat-sen
in its emphases in using capitalism for socialist ends, the priority it gives to people’s livelihood,
and public ownership of land as a developmental resource. See Philip C. C. Huang, “Chongqing:
Equitable Development Driven by a ‘Third Hand,’” Modern China, vol. 37, no. 6, 2011, pp. 569-
622. This experiment is currently in jeopardy due to a still unclear split in its leadership. For the
revival of the Yan’an Way, see Geremie R. Barme, “The Children of Yan’an: New Words of Warning
to a Prosperous Age,” China Heritage Quarterly, no. 26, June 2011, http://www.chinaheritagequar-
terly.org/features.php?searchterm=026_yanan.inc&issue=026 (consulted on 30 April 2012).
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Mao quote in four parts in Mao’s hand from the revolutionary museum at Yan’an (延安革命纪念馆): Shi Shi Qiu Shi.
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Chinese characteristics will definitely be expanded through the innovative
practice of the Party and the people, and the system of socialism with Chi-
nese characteristics will surely continue to improve as we deepen reform
and open up wider. This process will certainly open up broad prospects for
theoretical innovation. In upholding Marxism under the new historical con-
ditions, it is important to promptly address new issues emerging in practice
and thus provide scientific guidance for practice. We should have a correct
understanding of the global development trend and China’s basic condition
of being in the primary stage of socialism, find out more about the features
of China’s development at the current stage, review the new experience
gained in a timely manner by the people led by the Party, and create new
theories with the focus on major issues concerning economic and social
development, so as to ensure the vitality of scientific theories. (48)
This endless development of theory in response to the changing needs of
practice suggests that theory no longer serves as a check on, or even guide
to, future developments, which are to be determined solely by their efficacy
in securing the developmental goals of the regime. It is not that there is no
longer any concern for Marxism; on the contrary, the Party repeatedly
stresses its loyalty to the essence of Marxism as the thread that runs
through the development of Chinese Marxism. Official publications express
considerable concern over ignorance of Marxism, indifference to it for no
longer being relevant, or feigning interest while undermining it, clearly re-
ferring above all to Party cadres. (49) Hu Jintao was responsible for initiating
in 2004 a “Marxism project” (Makesizhuyi gongcheng 马克思主义工程) in-
tended to produce an interpretation of Marxist classics appropriate to con-
temporary circumstances. One of the basic goals of the project was to
provide theoretical, historical, and educational material that would give co-
herence to Party policies and revitalise the study of Marxism – Chinese
Marxism. (50)
The project is important for understanding the regime’s attitude toward
Marxism and Mao’s place in it. The primary purpose of the project was to
establish an unfolding Chinese Marxism on firmer theoretical ground by un-
covering in the Marxist classics evidence that Marx and Engels at least in
theory had anticipated developments in Chinese socialism; in other words,
by articulating texts to policies that had guided the course the Chinese rev-
olution had taken, as well as the policies of the leadership of “socialism with
Chinese characteristics” from Deng through Jiang to Hu. As the authors of
Zhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhan shi write, “The only Chinese Marxism is Marx-
ism that has been integrated with Chinese realities. Only by answering to
the needs of the Chinese revolution and reconstruction can Chinese Marx-
ism take shape and advance.” (51)
This is a theme that in a basic way runs through the corpus of Mao Zedong
Thought, from Mao during New Democracy to Hu Jintao as the most recent
representative of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” What is new
about it is ruling out or downgrading certain fundamental features of Marx-
ist theory – notably class analysis – from any consideration in the formation
of Chinese Marxism. The issue of class is dismissed as having been exagger-
ated in the days of New Democracy, abused during the Cultural Revolution,
and irrelevant under the socialist regime. While vigilance is called for against
both the “right” and the “left,” it is the “left” that represents the more im-
portant threat to the Party’s policies and the country’s security and wel-
fare. (52) The problem is that leaving out those aspects of Marxist theory that
contradict the regime’s policies obviates the need to engage Marxist theory
in its wholeness, and suffers from the same tendentiousness in the reading
of theory as its Cultural Revolution predecessors. Sweeping aside the issue
of class also glosses over the contradictions of New Democracy that pro-
duced the conflicts of the 1950s, and the contradictions that mark Chinese
society today. Marxism is obviously too important for the regime’s legiti-
macy to be simply cast aside. It is nevertheless instrumentalised in the serv-
ice of policies that accommodate capitalism, which is in the process of
transforming Chinese society – and not in any direction recognisable as so-
cialism. What the future may bring is another matter, of course, but then
judging by what the regime says, Marxism in the future may serve any and
all policies that suit the needs of China as the regime perceives them. The
gap between promise and reality may be an important reason that many
in and out of China remain sceptical of the regime’s Marxism or socialist
commitments.
On the other hand, the claims to Marxism need to be taken seriously for
what they suggest. Chinese Marxism is a Marxism that is rooted in the
Marxist tradition going back to Marx and Engels – “ancestors” (laozuzong
老祖宗), as Deng Xiaoping described them. (53) But it is also Marxism that
has been integrated with Chinese circumstances in keeping with the history
of Marxism, which has taken national form everywhere. And as the circum-
stances change, so does the synthesis of theory and practice. What is im-
plied here is that Marxism is a work in progress and needs to be re-invented
on an ongoing basis if it is not to degenerate into dogma. (54) It is not a mat-
ter of following texts, but of creating new Marxisms out of them. Hence
the insistence in the new texts on Chinese Marxism that both New Democ-
racy and “socialism with Chinese characteristics” opened new eras in the
unfolding of Marxism. They are most relevant to China, but they have im-
plications for other societies as well at a time when socialism is in retreat.
Two considerations guide the project. First, however fundamental the prin-
ciples and methods of Marxism, Marx and Engels could not have foretold
the course socialism would take once it had been established. Secondly,
theoretical development to answer to contemporary needs can no longer
rely on the mediation of Soviet interpretations, as in the past, but requires
independent investigation of the texts. (55) The investigation of texts has
been international in scope as Chinese researchers comb libraries for Marxist
texts, in some ways assuming leadership in such research. There is a sug-
gestion in some discussions that the project of making Marxism Chinese
has assumed an even broader scope than earlier. One text points to four di-
mensions to making Marxism Chinese: “concretisation” (jutihua 具体化) of
theory, “nationalisation” (minzuhua 民族化) of its form, “modernisation” (xi-
andaihua 现代化) of the classics, and “practicalisation” (shijianhua 实践化)
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49. Guo Dehong, Zhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhan shi, op. cit., p. 382.
50. Xiao Dongbo and NieYueyan, Zhongguo gongchandang lilun jianshe de lishi jingyan yanjiu, op.
cit., pp. 228-231. See also, “Makesizhuyi gongcheng jiaocai meibenzhi shaotouru liangbaiwan
yuan”(马克思主义工程教材每本至少投入两百万元 At least 2 million yuan to be spent on
each volume of the teaching materials of the Marxism project), Liaowang dongfang zhoukan, 26
October 2004. Author’s personal collection. I am grateful to the Central Compilation and Transla-
tion Bureau (Zhongyangbianyiju 中央编译局), especially its vice-director, Dr. Yu Keping (俞可平
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51. Guo Dehong, Zhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhan shi, op cit., p. 381,
52. Ibid., pp. 384-385.
53. Ibid., p. 383.
54. The preferred term is “innovate” (chuangxin 创新), which has become a very popular term in the
Party lexicon, especially since Jiang Zemin.
55. Interview with Yang Jinhai (杨金海), Deputy Secretary of the Central Compilation and Translation
Bureau, August 2006. Yang has been one of the foremost interpreters of the philosophical basis of
Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook on Development.” See also, Yang Jinhai, “Makesizhuyi jingdian
zhuzuo yanjiu de xianzhuang he weilai” (马克思主义经典著作研究的现状和未来 The con-
temporary condition and the future of studies of Marxist classics). Unpublished discussion paper.
I am grateful to Yang Jinhai for providing me with these materials.
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of its theoretical form. (56) Especially significant is the modernisation of the
classics.
Whether or not these new departures point to aspirations to leadership
in global Marxism commensurate with the regime’s newfound power in the
world as the foremost success story of socialism, or better still as a socialist
version of capitalism, there is not much question about the immediate goals
of refurbishing Chinese Marxism theoretically and giving it canonical status.
What is less obvious but even more significant is that it is the Chinese pres-
ent – the standpoint of an unfolding Chinese Marxism – that provides the
guide to reading the classics and, in a manner of speaking, re-theorising the
theory. What will be left of Marxism by the time they are finished remains
to be seen. Mao’s successors have arguably gone beyond anything he
claimed in making theory their own, subservient to the practices of national
development within a context of global capitalism. Ironically, the more they
change Marxism to respond to contemporary circumstances, the less con-
nected they seem to an environment in which Marxism carries little weight
among the population at large. But they may legitimately claim, as they do,
that they are following the example of the Chairman – both in making
Marxism Chinese and in silencing critics from the left who would suggest
that the more the theory becomes “Chinese,” the less there is left of it that
may be viewed as Marxist in any serious sense of that term. (57)
Conclusion
Mao has both an ancestral and a phantom existence in texts on Party his-
tory and Chinese Marxism. Like Marx, Engels, and Lenin before him, he is an
ancestor to the present, and a source of valuable lessons and principles to
draw upon as necessary or appropriate. As the founding ancestor of Chinese
Marxism, he commands an even greater immediacy than Marx and Engels
as an example in rendering theory meaningful for practice. On the other
hand, it is obviously no easy task to de-personalise Mao Zedong Thought,
or to safely retire Mao’s policies to a receding past while upholding the
“thought” named after him as an exemplary principle of theorising the
Party’s changing practice. Continued uncertainty over the future – whether
in calls for a return to New Democracy or renewed experiments with “red-
ness,” among others – seems inevitably to play out on a discursive terrain
in which Mao is ever present in one form or another. In its very appropriation
by the Party, Mao Zedong Thought guarantees to Mao and Maoism a phan-
tom existence that is imminent in Chinese socialism, both in its achieve-
ments and its anxieties.
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